Can Khmer Rouge Survivors Get Justice?

"Attempts at providing Khmer Rouge victims with long overdue justice have faltered badly."

Source: ECCC, Cambodia

Over a period of several decades, Cambodia experienced prolonged civil conflict that cast a paralyzing shadow over its entire society, most notably during the rule of the Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge from 1975 to early 1979. That brutal regime is estimated to have killed approximately 1.7 million Cambodian people through various systematic means including torture, execution, enslavement, starvation and forced labor, under its Maoist-oriented ideology – the so-called Super Great Leap Forward policy – combined with a heavy dose of paranoia.

January 7, 1979 was for Cambodia a milestone. That was the day the Vietnam-backed Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS), under Heng Samrin, the current president of National Assembly, captured the capital Phnom Penh, finally ousting the Khmer Rouge several days later. However, for another 19 years, Khmer Rouge soldiers waged guerilla warfare along the northern borders with Thailand, a conflict that only ended with the death of Pol Pot (in 1998) and other cadres and the Win-Win Policy of the Hun Sen government.

One year before peace was finally restored to the kingdom, the Cambodian government had lodged a proposal for a postwar transitional justice court with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), in which it sought assistance in setting up trial proceedings against the “most responsible” Khmer Rouge leaders. Eventually, in 2006, the so-called hybrid Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) began work with financial aid from more than 35 countries (with Japan to date accounting for almost 50 percent of all contributions to the court) to prosecute Khmer Rouge senior leaders and those “most responsible” for genocide, crimes against humanity, and other serious abuses committed during the Khmer Rouge-reigned period.

Since the court began its work in 2006, with high expectations that it would give victims justice in postwar Cambodia, more than 30,000 people, including survivors, have visited the court to witness trial proceedings. Millions more have followed on television or online.

In 2012, the court finally ended the very time-consuming case 001, sentencing prison chief Kaing Guek Eav, known as Duch, to life imprisonment for his “shocking and heinous” crimes. As of early 2011, four senior Khmer Rouge leaders – Noun Chea, the deputy secretary known as “brother number two”; Khieu Samphan, head of state of Democratic Kampuchea; Ieng Sary, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Ieng Thirith, minister of social affairs – had been indicted. They were thus the defendants in case 002, in which they would answer for their actions during the alleged genocide.

But over the last eight years, the ECCC has been widely criticized for the languid pace of its proceedings. It has also faced many challenges, making it uncertain whether or not full transitional justice will be possible, not only for those who were killed, but also for those who lived, traumatized and bereft.

Challenges

Even prior to case 002, the court was dealing with government displeasure over subsequent cases. For instance, cases 003 and 004 have been deemed sensitive, involving former Khmer Rouge cadres who currently hold high-ranking positions in the government. The court has also been criticized for incompetence, ineffectiveness, corruption, lengthy trial proceedings, and complicated political issues. The ECCC has consequently been widely regarded as inadequate and unable to deliver the justice that would satisfy either its donors or the victims.

Since early 1999, neither Cambodia’s local civil society organizations (CSOs) nor its citizens have had much say in the functioning of the tribunal. Therefore, despite the ongoing proceedings, the CSOs and Cambodian people, especially the victims, have been regarded as followers of the trials, rather than as active participants. In short, the court’s agenda has been dominated by the government and the ECCC.

Another hurdle for justice is the practical inability for the court to prosecute any individuals who are currently part of the government. Hun Sen clearly prioritizes national security, social harmony, political stability, and steady economic growth, even if that is at the expense of justice. And the Cambodian judiciary is hardly independent, ultimately answering to the Supreme Council of Magistry, a constitutional body with the power to take disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors.

Appetite within the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) for prosecutions is weak. Prime Minister Hun Sen – a former Khmer Rouge commander who defected in 1977 – together with other senior government officials are opposed to further trials, repeatedly warning that additional prosecutions would upset reconciliation with former Khmer Rouge guerillas, and spark another civil war, although many independent Cambodian political analysts see that as unlikely.

In fact, Hun Sen has been explicit in saying that there would be no more than “four or five individuals” in cases 001 and 002 who would be charged, and that cases 003 and 004 “would not be allowed.” Any investigations in the latter cases would “not happen on my watch,” he said. “The UN and the countries [including China] that supported Pol Pot to occupy Cambodia’s seat at the UN from 1979 to 1991 should be tried first. They should be sentenced more heavily than Pol Pot.”

Information Minister Khieu Kanharith concurred: “If they [international staff] want to go into case 003 and 004, they should just pack their bags and leave [Cambodia].” And so only five former senior Khmer Rouge leaders have to date appeared before the tribunals, while the low and mid-level perpetrators and other top government leaders, including former Khmer Rouge military and political cadres who would certainly seem to fit the description of “most responsible” for the atrocities, are now in power and apparently safe from prosecution.

Meanwhile, the Cambodian government has been unwilling to cooperate with the ECCC in building a permanent center to store its archives, as a resource for students, scholars, and other researchers studying war crimes and other Khmer Rouge atrocities. The Japanese government offered $2 million to build the center, with the Cambodian side to fund its operations. More than four years later, however, although the center has long been built, it still stands empty on a patch of land in Sen Sok district. CPP spokesman, Phay Siphan, said he was “unaware” of any legacy project, while Neth Pheaktra, a spokesman for the court, said there was “no money available [from Cambodian side] to embark on the sustained legacy project,” although the government has had no trouble funding dozens of ceremonies, including the recent Angkor Sangkran celebration taking place on Khmer’s traditional New Year in Siem Reap province recently.

The court has faced other troubles. In a 2007 and 2008 kickback scandal, “Cambodian staff complained that they were being forced to bribe their superiors to keep their [lucrative] jobs.” Former UN human rights envoy to Cambodia, Yash Gai, wrote in 2009 that “the weakness and corruption within the national legal system have infected the ECCC, instead of the ECCC influencing the conduct of local judges and prosecutors.” Similarly, according to Kelli Muddell, a rapporteur from International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), the Cambodian people have lost faith in the public institutions and have little trust that perpetrators would be held accountable before the ECCC, given the corruption in the legal system.

The lengthy proceedings have been costly, with spending estimated at more than $200 million. Much of the funding for the court has come from international donors, who have been told that “their money was purchasing not only a semblance of justice [for Cambodians], but also lasting improvements in the Cambodian judiciary.” Given the advance ages and health problems of the defendants in case 002, it is questionable whether justice can truly be delivered.

Any change will require from all parties – the Cambodian government, the ECCC itself, CSOs, and the Cambodian people – a genuine willingness and commitment, with strict regulations to tackle corruption scandals along with effective and rapid reform. For now, though, a lack of stakeholder participation, a patronage-driven court structure, systematic corruption, financial question, time-consuming trial proceedings, and particularly a dubious commitment from the government look likely to deny Khmer Rouge victims their justice.

What is ASEAN Centrality in East Asian Regionalism?

Photo: RIA Novosti

The notion of “ASEAN centrality”, “ASEAN driver’s seat”, and “ASEAN driving force” are interchangeably used. Thus far, this concept of ASEAN centrality has been differently and broadly defined in the previous literatures and therefore needs to be well understood in this short article prior to getting more aware of the significance of ASEAN in regional and global context.

According to Hadi Soesastro, ASEAN centrality is broadly described as roles of ASEAN in East Asian regionalism simply because ASEAN is “less objectionable” to various regional powers – China, South Korea, and Japan (Soesastro, 2007). In the similar sense, Mr. Lim Chze Cheen defined ASEAN centrality as ASEAN’s cooperative efforts to “deal with common issues, solve common problems, and take common actions” (Lim, 2012). Both of them focus on friendly and harmless presence of ASEAN functions or its collective actions to grapple with common regional issues and problems as the ASEAN centrality. Alice D. Ba more specifically looked at the “functionalism” of ASEAN in institutionalizing Northeast Asian countries, which he described as the ASEAN centrality (Ba, 2009). According to Ba, the ASEAN centrality based on ASEAN itself as a regional grouping and individual ASEAN States seized “initiative functions” even before ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit (EAS) come into existence. For example, ASEAN itself and individual ASEAN States initiated ASEAN Six Plus Three (ASEAN-6+3)^{^[1]}, ASEAN Seven Plus Three (ASEAN-7+3)^{^[2]}, and then ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) in 1997 (Ba, 2009). Moreover, in accordance with the 2009 ASEAN Security Blueprint, in order to strengthen ASEAN centrality in regional cooperation and community building, “ASEAN shall initiate, host, chair, and/or co-chair activities and meetings with its Dialogue Partners within the context of ASEAN+3, EAS, and ARF; initiate and implement concrete cooperation activities; advance ARF towards preventive diplomacy; and enhance cooperation in ASEAN’s external relations and regional and multilateral flora” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). Thus, accordingly, the notion of ASEAN centrality means to be more functionally relevant to the ASEAN’s initiatives and administrative functions of the host and co-/chairmanship of meetings and activities for cooperation and development in the mentioned regional groupings. Additionally, some other scholars broadly defined ASEAN centrality as the “central hub” not merely for political but also for economic cooperation (Cheunboran, 2011; Jones, 2010; Corbett & Umezaki, 2009).

However, despite many existing literatures trying to define ASEAN centrality, there has so far been no any clear-cut, specific or commonly agreed or used definition of the notion of ASEAN centrality. Therefore, ASEAN centrality in East Asian regionalism specifically refers to ASEAN’s core roles in East Asian regional initiatives, coordination, chairmanship, co-chairmanship and host of activities and meetings in the architecturally institutionalized, economic, social, cultural, and political-security aspects.

[1] “ASEAN-6+3” consists of ASEAN-5 as original Members States (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), Brunei Darussalam as the 6^th ASEAN Member State, and three Northeast Asian countries, namely Japan, China, and South Korea (Ba, 2009).

[2] ASEAN-7+3 is composed of ASEAN-6 as mentioned above, one of four later ASEAN Members States, and the three Northeast Asian countries (Japan, China, and South Korea) (Ibid.).

References:

ASEAN Secretariat. (2009). Roadmap for an ASEAN community 2009-2015. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

Ba, A. D. (2009). Regionalism’s multiple negotiations: ASEAN in East Asia. US: Cambridge Review International Affairs.

Cheunboran, C. (2011). East Asian Community building: Challenges and future prospects (CICP Working No.36). Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace.

Corbett J., & Umezaki S (2009).Deepening East Asian economic integration. In Economic and Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (2010). ERIA research project report 2008, No.1: Deepening East Asian Economic Integration. Retrieved on 8 April 2010, from http://www.eria.org/pdf/research/y2008/no1/DEI-01-Table_of_Content_etc.pdf

Jones, L. (2010). Still in driver’s seat, but for how long? ASEAN’s capacity in leadership in East Asian international relations. Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, and Hamburg University Press.

Lim, C. C. (2012). The challenges ahead for ASEAN: Growing income gap. Special group discussion during ASEAN Young Leaders Dialogue on 6^th April 201, Sunway Hotel, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Soesastro, H. (2007). East Asia economic integration: The search for an institutional identity. Paper presented at Global Development Network Annual Meeting. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

ASEAN's Core Architectural Roles in Formation of East Asian Regionalism

"The formations of ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit are the true ASEAN Centrality in structuring regional architectures. With these two key regional institutionalized materialism/forum, ASEAN also vitalizes its default Centrality and leadership in East Asian regionalism whether or not to be able to stay in de facto driver’s seat in both economic and politico-security spheres."

ASEAN’s regional architectural effort is not a new force in attempting to establish East Asian regionalism. The beginning structures of such regionalism were intended and then proposed by South Korea to create an Asian Common Market in 1970 and by Japan to realize an Asian Network in 1988 (Stubbs, 2002) after Japan accorded itself to “Plaza Agreement” in 1985 to appreciate its national currency yen as the tremendous wave of Japan’s investments in East Asia and in especially economic as well as production tie with the Southeast Asian countries in search of lower production cost (Ba, 2009; Cheunboran, 2011). This economic wave was greatly viewed as a major impetus to the development and industrialization in East Asia in the so-called “flying-geese”[1] pattern in which Japan was regarded as the regional pioneer of the East Asian development and modernization, and consequently it greatly assisted in flourishing the four Asian tigers, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan and then other countries towards economic development (Cheunboran, 2011; Cumings, 1984; Yee, 2010). However, these first two proposals for such regional economic integration failed to bear fruits due to two reasons. First and foremost, historical rivalries or antagonism as legacies of the colonialism, international wars, and civil conflicts have resulted in political uncertainty, mutual suspicion, and distrust among the Northeast Asian great powers (Stubbs, 2002; Cheunboran, 2011; Ba, 2009; Petrov, 2012; Jones, 2009). The initiatives of the regional architectures of Japan and South Korea were suspected from the outset by China which mistrusted their proposals towards the regional multilateralism, given another fact that they are also the close U.S.-treaty allies in the regional “hub-and-spoke” security system[2] balancing the rising China in addition to their foreign relations endowed with the historical hatred as well as political challenges (Ikenberry, 2004; Cheunboran, 2012; Petrov, 2012). On the contrary, China in economic prosperity and military modernization made regional powers hard to geminate mutual trust and confidence in a context of “security dilemma”[3] even though their trades were commonly and mutually exchanged in the trends of regionalization. Second, there is no regional leadership towards the formation of regional multilateralism. Both South Korea and particularly Japan attempted to lead the regional orders and so did China. All of them, however, felt reluctant to resume the regional leadership due to their mutual suspicion. But, the creation of East Asian regionalism was not impossible since there are some critical factors bringing all Northeast Asian great powers to the East Asian regionalism with the assistance of de facto ASEAN Centrality. First, in its foreign policy, China wants to assure its social well-being, stabilizes its domestic regime, and at the same time spreads its influence abroad under six-fold interests that are worth being originally quoted as the following:

(i) maintain a stable political and security environment, particularly on China’s periphery, that will allow China’s economic growth to continue; (ii) maintain and expand trade route transiting Southeast Asia; (iii) gain access to regional energy resources and raw materials; (iv) develop trade relationship for economic and political purposes; (v) isolate Taiwan through the pursuit of a policy which China calls “using all economic and diplomatic resources to reward countries that are willing to isolate Taiwan”; and (vi) exert influence in the region to defeat perceived attempts at strategic encirclement or containment as well as to eradicate the perception that the rise of China is a threat (Cheunboran, 2009 & 2011).

Secondly, the engagement in regional multilateralism is in Japan’s existing policy aiming at stabilizing Japan’s business security, both its production bases and networks; recovering its economic growth; and enhancing politico-security relations with its East Asian neighboring countries (Cheunboran, 2011). Thirdly, South Korea with its heavy economic relations with China has the similar track to regional economic and politico-security cooperation. Fourthly, owing to the end of the Cold War and to dynamic economic globalization, ASEAN Countries themselves are also eager to further foster their cooperation with East Asian countries for co-prosperity (Cheunboran, 2011; Stubbs, 2002; Ba, 2009). Fifthly, with its planed cooperative benefits, ASEAN as a newly formed regional grouping in Southeast Asia was viewed as the most suitable facilitator which serves as a bridge linking these three powers and thus was granted the default centrality in East Asian regionalism formation simply because ASEAN were perceived as “less threats” or “less objectionable” to them (Stubbs, 2002; Cheunboran, 2011; Ba, 2009). For these internal and external reasons, the regional great powers acceded themselves to regional institutional multilateralism under ASEAN as a driving engine or force towards politico-security cooperation and further economic development opportunities.

With its naturally granted centrality or leadership in regional architectures, ASEAN evolutionarily initiated the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) in 1990 which was later renamed as the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in 1993 in response to a concern that the original name made it sound too much like an intension of the formation of regional trade bloc; institutionalized ASEAN and the Northeast Asian countries to form ASEAN+3 in 1997, and finally created the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 with the participation of other non-regional ASEAN Dialogue Partners[4] such as Australia, New Zealand, and India as original Member States and later with the involvement of the United States and Russia in 2011.

East Asian Economic Group (EAEG)

The East Asian Economic Group, abbreviated as EAEG, was initiated by Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, during the honorable dinner with Prime Minister Li Peng who was visiting Malaysia (Cheunboran, 2011). The initial purposes of P.M. Mahathir were to establish an economic group in response to the growing development of the global regionalisms, particularly European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to provide Asia with a strong voice in global economic and trade negotiations, and to consolidate the efforts with East Asian countries to develop themselves against the various Western blocking measures (Cheunboran, 2011; Severino, 2006; Research Note, 2002). It is clearly seen that the proposal of EAEG formation excluded the Western involvement because of P.M. Mahathir’s “Look East Policy” in 1982 as a consequence of the prosperous economic successes of especially Japan during 1980s and early 1990s, which were applauded as “The East Asian Miracle” (Said, 2002; Cheunboran, 2011; Sambutan, 2011; Yasuda, 2000).

The EAEG was proposed and explained by P.M. Mahathir to improve economic influence and bargaining power in East Asia during the 1993 ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting (AEM) in October in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. However, the EAEG was almost immediately turned into EAEC under APEC framework for three reasons. Firstly, renaming from EAEG to EAEC was to respond to the concern that it sounds too much like an attempt to establish a regional trade bloc which would face fierce opposition from U.S., and U.S. government also put “considerable” pressures on Japan and South Korea to reject the said proposal (Stubbs, 2002; Cheunboran, 2011; Rapkin, 2001; Ba, 2009). Secondly, in the intra-ASEAN, the Mahathir’s proposal was made first without any consultation with other ASEAN leaders in accordance with ASEAN traditional practice, and thus it made Indonesia doubtful about the proposal (Cheunboran, 2011; Stubbs, 2002). Thirdly, there was no clear concept of the EAEG itself whether to merely counterbalance EU and NAFTA or to enhance economic growth. Consequently, it was suspicious about future benefits resulted from the engagement in the EAEG and about the anti-NAFTA which would disappoint U.S. (Cheunboran, 2011; Stubbs, 2002). Last but not least, U.S. concerned emergence of the EAEG as regional trading bloc would affect the existing APEC[5] since its proposed Members are the majority of APEC (Cheunboran, 2011). As a consequence, the EAEG was immediately renamed the EAEC.

East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC)

Despite the strong opposition particularly from U.S., the concept of establishing the East Asian regionalism did not fade away due to the promising benefits resulted from such regional integration, and therefore the previously attempted EAEG concept was agreed to work towards the realization of the EAEC at the 1992 ASEAN Summit in Singapore. The EAEC at the 1993 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AFMM) was created under APEC frameworks. Although the caucus successfully came into existence, it was put on the back burner in terms of informal meetings over the regional cooperation because it was forestalled by the rapid development of APEC which established long-term trade liberalization at the 1994 Summit in Indonesia and which had APEC secretariat located in Singapore in 1992.

ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3)

In May 1992, Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew once said, “an idea [the EAEC] would not go away”, and thus the EAEC as the successor of EAEG did not fade away but greatly contributed to the successful creation of ASEAN+3 (Stubbs, 2002; Jones, 2009). In 1997, at the sideline of the Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN leaders and Northeast Asian powers met up, discussed, and eventually came up with the creation of East Asian regional institution later known as ASEAN+3 because of three driving factors. Firstly, Singapore expressed the support of transformation of the caucus into East Asian regionalism due to the unease among ASEAN Member States about the emergence of dynamic growth of the global regionalisms, particularly European Union, NAFTA, and EU-like African Union (Stubbs, 2002). Secondly, the “host [ASEAN] country”, Malaysia desired to strengthen the relations between ASEAN and Northeast Asian countries or moved from the informal “caucus” to the formal “institution” (Cheunboran, 2011). Fourthly, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) signaled the economic interdependence and cooperation among regional states. Fifthly, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) initiated by Singapore in Paris in 1994 was approved by both ASEAN and EU in the mid-1995. Northeast Asian representatives and ASEAN counterparts first participated in the preliminary ASEM meeting in 1995 and prepared for the coming ASEM meeting in Bangkok in 1996 on which they all agreed to continue the process and projected for the 1997 Economic Ministers’ and Foreign Ministers’ meetings as well as for the second ASEM meeting in London in 1998. Therefore, both Northeast Asian powers and ASEAN had frequent “de facto meetings” to coordinate their positions. For this reason, it was a significant impetus to moving the caucus to the ASEAN+3 (Stubbs, 2002; DPL, 2002). Last but not least, in January 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro visited Southeast Asia and initiated an “ASEAN-Japan leader meeting” which was later welcomed by ASEAN. However, to avoid China’s skepticism, ASEAN decided to invite the leaders of both China and South Korea to participate in the newly established regional cooperation mechanism (Cheunboran, 2011). For all of these reasons, ASEAN+3 came into existence in 1997.

The first ASEAN+3 Meeting in 1997 focused on the settlement of depreciation of Thai Bath currency and strengthened their economic stability and cooperation as well as on the need for ASEM coordination. At its second meeting in Hanoi in 1998, ASEAN+3 was approved to be held annually back to back with the ASEAN Summit (Cheunboran, 2011; Chap, 2007; Stubbs, 2002). Moreover, in response to South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung’s proposal, the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG)[6] was created for proposing concrete recommendations for regional cooperation (Stubbs, 2002; Cheunboran, 2011). And the “Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation” was adopted by ASEAN+3 leaders to formalize the ASEAN+3 process and to set up ten areas of which the financial cooperation is the most important partly in response to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, such as economic, finance, social, human resources development, disaster management, communicable diseases, science and technology, ICT development, politics, security, etc. (Cheunboran, 2011; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2009; Ba, 2009; Kesavapany, 2010; East Asian Study Group, 2002). Later on, another regional institution as the evolution of ASEAN+3 was proposed by the EAVG in the line of Malaysia’s initiative in 2001 and then recommended by the EASG to create the East Asia Summit (EAS) for the long-term cooperation and development measure.

East Asia Summit (EAS)

Besides the efforts in realizing ASEAN+3, the proposal of Malaysian Prime Minister to transform ASEAN+3 into EAS was not really successful due to the geographical matter. Rather the EAS was viewed as another regional multilateralism after the initiative of EAVG and the recommendation of EASG. The said Summit was first hosted by Malaysia in 2005, convened with the inclusiveness of non-regional Member States – India, New Zealand, and Australia, to counterbalance against the China’s rising power (Cheunboran, 2011). And those non-regional counterparts perceived the EAS as the “hub” for their future interests. It is also worth noticing that EAS is tied to ASEAN annual ministerial meetings which are “held in ASEAN countries”; ASEAN has also had core roles in facilitating and coordinating all great powers to discuss on broad strategic issues of relevance to East Asian, regional, and global issues: global terrorism, energy, infectious/communal diseases, poverty reduction, sustainable development, education, finance, etc. (Chap, 2007; Heng, 2012; Ba, 2009; Saputro, 2011; Cheunboran, 2011). Moreover, ASEAN possesses a major function in determination of EAS membership based on three main ASEAN-set criteria: Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), obtainment of ASEAN Dialogue Partner status, and possession of substantial relations with ASEAN as a whole (Cheunboran, 2011; Ba, 2009; Chap, 2007).

Due to these set criteria, Russia which had already acceded to TAC was not permitted to be an EAS member since it did not have the substantial [economic] relations with ASEAN (Chap, 2007; Cheunboran, 2011). Other countries like EU, Pakistan, and Mongolia were also interested in the EAS but could not be its Members because EU was still in the process of accession to TAC, while both Pakistan and Mongolia, though acceding to TAC, are not full memberships or substantial relations with ASEAN (Cheunboran, 2011). Moreover, owing to U.S. reengagement policy in Asia under Obama’s administration, U.S. finally signed TAC in 2009 and reluctantly expressed its interests in the EAS after the official visit of U.S. State Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton in Asian countries. And at the same time, the long-awaited Russia’s attempted engagement in EAS was still puzzled among ASEAN leaders to deal with a question “why we only admit the U.S. which has always been reluctant to join the EAS, while ignoring Russia which has all along shown its keen interests in participating in the process” (Interview with a Cambodian diplomat, cited from Cheunboran, 2011). Therefore, both U.S. and Russia became the new Member States in the East Asia Summit in 2011.

In short, the formations of ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit are the true ASEAN Centrality in structuring regional architectures. With these two key regional institutionalized materialism/forum, ASEAN also vitalizes its default Centrality and leadership in East Asian regionalism whether or not to be able to stay in de facto driver’s seat in both economic and politico-security spheres.

[1] Bruce Cumings applied the analogy of ‘flying geese’ as the economic pattern – in his article The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences (1984) – to East Asia, meaning that East Asian economies follow one another in a developmental trajectory of replication and homogenisation of industrial structures (Cumings, 1984).

[2] Hub-and-spoke security system is the analogy implying that U.S. as the “Hub” or “Center” of the spokes and U.S.-treaty allies: Australia/New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand as the “Spokes” established the security treaty each with U.S. for close security cooperation in the Asia/Asia Pacific region.

[3] According to Robert Jevis, in realist approach, security dilemma means that both strength and weakness in national security can be provocative to other nations. For instance, if a nation is too strong, this can be provocative since “most means of self-protection simultaneously menace others” (Jevis, 1976).

[4] ASEAN has ten “Dialogue Partners”, namely Australia, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, and the United States. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also has dialogue status.

[5] APEC, which stands for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation created in January 1989 by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, is forum for 21 Pacific Rim countries in response to the economic cooperation and further comprehensive economic cooperation across the Pacific Rim region. APEC has been perceived as a very significant economic forum for particularly the United States, and therefore U.S. started to oppose any initiative of regional economic or trading bloc, e.g. EAEG in early 1990s, undermining the newly established APEC.

[6] EAVG is composed of 26 civilian experts, reporting to East Asian Study Group (EASG) of the senior officials. The tasks of EASG were to present the recommendations on the concrete measures by EAEG to the ASEAN+3 leaders in order to accelerate the regional cooperation and to realize the East Asia Summit (EAS).

References:

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2009). ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation. Retrieved on May 9, 2012, from http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm

Cheunboran, C. (2009, November). China’s soft power in Southeast Asia (Cambodian Journal of International Affairs). Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP).

Cumings, B. (1984). The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: Industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences. U.S.: The MIT Press.

Ikenberry, G. J. (2004). American hegemony and East Asian order (pp. 353–367). Vol. 58, No.3. Australia: Carfax Publishing.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics (p.63). N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Petrov, L. (2012). Northeast Asia: A region without regionalism. Retrieved on May 25, 2012, from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/23/northeast-asia-a-region-without-regionalism/

Research Note. (2002). ASEAN Plus Three: Towards the world's largest free trade agreement? (p.1). Australia: Department of the Parliamentary Library.

Rapkin, D. (2001). The United States, Japan, and the power to block: the APEC and AMF cases (p.373–410). The U.S.: Pacific Review.

Sambutan, K. (2011). 1982 Look East policy. Retrieved on May 8, 2012, from http://www.malaysiamerdeka.gov.my/v2/en/achievements/services/157-1982-dasar-pandang-ke-timur

Saputro, E. N. (2011). The East Asia Summit and financial cooperation. Retrieved on May 10, 2012, from East Asia Forum http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/18/ the-east-asia-summit-and-regional-financial-cooperation/

Severino, R. (2006). Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community. Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).

Yasuda, N. (2000). ASEAN competition laws: Current state and future perspectives. ASEAN workshop: Making market work, hosted by the Australian Competition and Customer Commission in Bangkok, Thailand.

Yee, A. (2010). Asian economic integration? Address domestic inequalities. Retrieved on May 25, 2012, from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/13/asian-economic-integration-address-domestic-inequalities/

U.S. Foreign Aid Diplomacy in Developing Country

"Recently, the U.S. foreign aids are given to developing countries for the multi-purposes but more likely for its security interest in resisting against global terrorism. And all of those trends more or less serve the U.S. interests in expansion its markets, trades, and commerce; in its democratic ideology and its political influences; and also in its military strengths as the global superpower or the hegemonic state in the entire world."

U.S. foreign aid as we know it today began in 1947 was introduced and strategically utilized in the U.S. foreign policy in developing countries to serve U.S. interests (Ann, 2005). The interests of the United States in those developing states are dynamic, flexible, and contextual owing to the different U.S. administrations. Therefore, according to the previous studies on U.S. foreign aid diplomacy, U.S. foreign aid is unanimously agreed and defined as the major tool to bring socio-economic development as well as the political reforms to developing countries to serve the U.S. political, security, and economic interest (Ann & Carol, 2005; Raymond, 2007; Curt, 1994; Louis & Robert, 2008; John, 2008; Carol, 2007).

Surely enough, the provision of U.S. foreign aids for developing countries is strongly associated with the U.S. political interest. According to Carol Lancaster (2007), after the Second World War, U.S. aids were first introduced in the U.S. foreign policy through its Marshall Plan in Western developing countries, Greek and Turkey in particular, to resist against the communist influence. After the late 1950, newly independent countries emerged in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. U.S. rethought of using its foreign aids to build the Cold War alliance to combat against the communist states and to bring them back the democracy which was the main U.S. political objective to attain its sphere of influence in the regions (Raymond, 2007; Carol, 2007). Moreover, the growing view among U.S. new developmentalist policy-makers that supporting economic and social progress in those countries was much more important in shaping the outcome of the Cold War than simply providing their governments with aids to help stabilize their economies leading to stable, democratic states under the influence of U.S. (Louis & Robert, 2008; John, 2008; Carol, 2007). Besides, U.S. has continued to provide its aids to some countries under its influence such as Thailand, India, the Philippines, etc. so as to strengthen democracy and maintain its military-bases for the sake of both political and security interests (Carol, 2007). Moreover, according to Raymond (2007), Carol (2007), and John (2008), the U.S. aids are also used to eliminate poverty tensions of the developing countries and bring them to support U.S. politics and indirectly stay under U.S. political influence. For instance, in 1960s, U.S aids rose fivefold from $157 million, or 5 percent of US aid, to $989 million, or 25 percent of US aid overall to Latin America, and IADB was established in the initiative of U.S. to provide non-interest loans to those Latin American states in order to “stop the anti-American sentiment including the violent demonstrations in 1958 against U.S. under Nixon administration” (Carol, 2007) to bring back the U.S. political influence in the region.

Moreover, according to Louis Picard and Robert Groelsema (2008), Raymond (2007), and Carol Lancaster (2007), the U.S. foreign aids since 1980s were political in motive because the aids given to governments in developing countries were attached with a condition that the political reforms needed to be fulfilled. Therefore, the governments received U.S. foreign aids and, in return, pursued democracy, good governance, transparency, accountability, and political participation of civil societies and nongovernmental organizations under the political influence of the United States. For example, U.S. gave around $147.2 million to sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 through its large projects in support of political reform toward democracy (John, 2008). Moreover, the U.S. foreign aids on the socio-cultural development in developing countries also serve U.S. political interest because it can effectively change the people’s political culture through public education and Peace Corps in democratically participating in politics (Carol, 2007; Louis & Robert, 2008; Ann & Carol, 2005; Raymond, 2007). For example, in 1970s, U.S. Congress provided $1 billion for the new aid programs: peace education, Peace Corps, etc. and another $2.4 billion for HIV/AIDS prevention under specific policies of USAID in developing countries for public health care, peace, and democracy (Louis & Robert, 2008). However, according to Curt Reinstma (1994), U.S. rather uses its foreign aids on environmental protection projects to increase the participation of social societies, local NGOs, and individuals in the social development because those non-state actors actively participate in and oversee governments’ project implementation at local level; therefore, it is more likely that U.S. tends to make the governments in Africa more transparent and accountable in the democratic process of project implementation. In short, U.S. has used its foreign aids to serve its political interest.

Besides the political interest, the U.S. foreign aids are also provided for developing countries for the sake of U.S. security interest. According to Carol (2007) and Raymond (2007), U.S. during the Cold War period offered its aids to newly independent countries to avoid the communist influences and to develop their economies followed by the democratic, stable societies that would cause no harms to the United States because U.S. believed that communist ideology was an expansionist, atheistic, militaristic form of social organization that presented a serious threat to the U.S. security (Carol, 2007; Raymond, 2008). Moreover, the foreign aids also enable U.S. to strengthen the diplomatic relations with its political allies such as Thailand, the Philippines, post-WWII Japan, etc. to construct military exercises and maintain U.S. military bases over the sovereignty of those countries for the sake of serving U.S. geopolitical strategy and to enhance its military power as a global dominant or hegemonic state to protect its security as well as the world as a whole (Raymond, 2008; John, 2008).

Based on the studies by Louis Picard and Robert Groelsema (2008), John Harbeson (2008), and Carol Lancaster (2007), after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the United States significantly increased its aids to fight against the terrorism and further provided post-millennium aids through USAID to fragile states and other developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve stability, political reform, and capacity building because as former U.S. President, George W. Bush, once said, “…weak states can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states [because] poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders” (John, 2008). For instance, in 2000s, U.S. granted $87 billion to finance military and reconstruction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan to fight against the aggressive Iraqi leaders, Al Qui-da terrorist group, and the terrorist Taliban (Louis & Robert, 2008) who primarily and seriously threatened U.S. security domestically and abroad. Therefore, it is clearly seen that U.S. foreign aids are also used to advance U.S. security interests at domestic and global level.

Last but not least, based on the previous studies, the U.S. foreign aids are also associated with the economic interest of the United States (Louis & Robert, 2008; Raymond, 2008; John, 2008; Carol, 2007; Ann & Carol, 2005). During the post-WWII period, U.S. provided $13 billion to the Western developing countries to reconstruct their market-based economies which were huge enough for U.S. trades and commerce (Carol, 2007). Moreover, according to Carol (2007), John (2008), Ann & Carol (2005), and Raymond (2008), the aids from U.S. also influence the developing states to liberalize their markets or to provide certain market freedom in the aims of expanding U.S. trades and commerce for its economic growth. For example, in 2002, W. Bush initiated aids on Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to government for economic openness and just governance. Additionally, according to Ann and Carol (2005), in the 21^st century U.S. foreign aids are also used to foster the diplomatic relations between states and therefore enable U.S. to effectively expand its markets abroad. The evidence shows that for its economic interest, U.S. provided billion dollars as aids to finance military and reconstruction projects in Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, etc. for the oil supplies to help develop U.S. industries and productivities in the global economy (Louis & Robert, 2008). Therefore, it is certainly sure that U.S. has long benefited its economy from its foreign aids given to the developing countries.

Throughout the synthesis and critical evaluation of all of the sources above, it is certainly clear that U.S has periodically changed or shifted the direction of its foreign aid policy from the containments of communism in the newly independent and former communist-bloc countries to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance, from the military reconstruction to poverty reduction and environmental protection, and from the economic reconstruction and national building to market freedom and capitalist market-based economy in the 21^st century. Recently, the U.S. foreign aids are given to developing countries for the multi-purposes but more likely for its security interest in resisting against global terrorism as we can see the U.S. missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the world. And all of those trends more or less serve the U.S. interests in expansion its markets, trades, and commerce; in its democratic ideology and its political influences; and also in its military strengths as the global superpower or the hegemonic state in the entire world.

References:

Ann, V. D., & Carol, L. (2005). Organizing U.S. foreign aid: confronting the challenges of the Twenty-first Century. Washington D.C.: Victor Graphics.

Carol, L. (2007). Foreign aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics. The United States of America: The University of Chicago Press.

Curt, R. (1994). Proceeding of USAID natural resources management and environmental policy conference. U.S.: AMEX International, Inc.

John, W. H. (2008). Post-millennium US aid for Africa: Reconciliation for freedom and security, theirs and ours. USA: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Louis, A. P., & Robert, G. (2008). U.S. foreign aid priorities: Goals for the twenty-first century. USA: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Raymond, W. C. (2007). The United States in Africa: Bush policy and beyond. Malta: Gutenberg Press Ltd.

Appendices:

Graph 1: Total U.S. Aid (Net)

Graph 2: U.S. Financial Aid – Official Development Assistance and Official Assistance 1949-2003

Neoliberalism and Current Events

"Neoliberalism consisting of four main theoretical strands is the fundamental theory to explain current events ranging from national individuals, groups, and organizations to international state and non-state actors and from local issues to global challenges in the recent complex, diverse international relations."

Certainly, there is no doubt that numerous IR theories have periodically been enhanced, modified, and developed over the time according to the relations and interactions of the international actors in international system. In this similar sense, the global issues and diverse, complex challenges of those actors, resulting in many various consequences, need IR theories to be explained, ascertained, and interpreted. Therefore, IR theories are so important to be used in the study of international relations to understand and explain the broad range of events and issues ranging from the local to the global level outright. Likewise, the 21^st century complex international events can be best explained by using neoliberalism as the fundamental theory rebuilt from the classical liberalism.

Neoliberalism which is the renewed liberal approach was established from around 1950s to 1970s, and it embraces four important strands: sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, institutional liberalism, and republican liberalism. With the renewed scientific approach and the concepts of the possibility of progress as well as changes that could be seen in today’s phenomena, neoliberalism can best explain today’s international events.

The first strand of neoliberalism is sociological liberalism that focuses on the transnationalism or transnational relations of international actors, both state and non-state actors (Robert & Georg, 2007). In this similar sense, sociological liberalism validates that IR is not just about the mere state-and-state relations but also about the transnational relations between individuals, groups, and organizations belonging to different countries. According to the neoliberal scholar James Rosenau, transnationalism refers to “the process whereby international relations conducted by state governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups, and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of events” (Robert & Georg, 2007). For sure, after the Second World War and particularly the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rapid increase in not only the state actors owing to the decolonization and secessionism but also in non-state actors in international relations due to the emergence of complex, diverse global challenges. Therefore, in this 21^st century, states are no longer in the position of the only single actors in international system. Along with state actors, non-state actors like individuals, groups, and organizations are also important in international relations today. For concrete example, Cambodian government alone cannot successfully prevent or even reduce HIV/AIDS at all. Thus, in cooperation with numerous transnational non-state actors like Oxfam, PSI, Save Children, the AIDS ACCESS Foundation of Thailand and the like, the Cambodian government can effectively and successfully cut down the number of HIV positives and neutralize as well as prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS to some particular extent. Similarly, in Cambodia today, International Labor Organization (ILO) actively functions on various areas ranging from the drafting of laws and the application of internationally-agreed standards to institution building, health and safety, labor migration, social protection, discrimination, crisis response, child labor and forced labor (ILO, 2010) since the government alone is inadequate or even impossible to successfully solve the issues related to labor violation and abuses. At global level, during the 2010 UN General Assembly in New York, NGO groups as lobbyists persuaded states to really put their preliminary agendas in practice for the sake of realization of the sustained economic growth and sustainable development and to pay more attention to human rights and other related issues.

Moreover, another neoliberal scholar, Karl Deutsch, emphasizes that the high degree of transnational tie between societies leads to peaceful relations and social integration (Robert & Georg, 2007). “Social Integration”, according to Deutsch, means “sense of community” (Robert & Georg, 2007). Therefore, this theory means that with the sense of community, international state and non-state actors together resolve the common issues and global challenges. Recently, in his newly published article, Margaret has found that some conflicts in the world today often involve transnational armed groups who act autonomously from recognized governments, and these groups include transnational terrorist groups, rebel groups, cross-border irregular armed groups, insurgents, dissident armed forces, guerillas, international liberation movements, and multinational freedom fighters (Margaret, n.d.) which have posted great threats to international peace and security. For example, Al Qaeda terrorist groups today have many transnational networks in various countries and spread their terrorist marginal or large-scale attacks in some particular countries like U.S., Russia, Britain, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq. Therefore, with sense of community, not only state actors like Cambodia, U.S., France, Russia, Germany, Britain, as well as many other countries but also some specific non-state actors together have the common purpose to combat against the terrorism and to maintain the international peace and security. Also, regarding to current global climate change, not only states themselves but also numerous non-state actors like World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF), Green Peace, International NGOs Sunday, and other transnational NGOs take the common actions to prevent the global climate change, protect environment, and pursue the sustainable environmental development in the world.

In addition, James Rosenau stressed that the transnational relations of individuals, groups, organizations result in two important consequences (Robert & Georg, 2007). First, there is the extension of cross-border activities owing to better education, electronic communication, and travel (Robert & Georg, 2007). Surely, the widespread transnational extension of relations between individuals can be seen almost everywhere in this era. For example, Cambodian people can openly and freely communicate with Americans, Japanese, Chinese, Israelis, or even Africans anytime and anywhere through modern telecommunication such as the Internet, telephone, electronic fax, and electronic messages with fast speed and time saving. Additionally, individuals, groups, and organizations today can easily expend their relations through travelling from one place to another worldwide. Second, such transnational partnerships/relations constitute a hybrid type of governance in which non-state actors co-govern along with state actors and thereby adopt governance functions that have formerly been the sole authority of sovereign states (Robert & Georg, 2007). This means the capacities of states for control and regulations within their territories decrease. Simply put, the national sovereignty of states declines when there is the increase in transnationalism. For the concrete instance, Angkor Centre for Conservation of Biodiversity (ACCB) criticizes Cambodian government when there is the increasingly deforestation without the strict actions taken by the government. Thus, Cambodia’s autonomous rights which are unquestioned and always rightful based on Westphalian sovereignty are now eroded. Moreover, commonly seen, transnational NGOs undermine states’s sovereignty by creating a “world civic politics”, and those NGOs lead to the “a new cosmopolitan order” that will reduce the autonomous rule-making authority of states (Englehart, 2004). For example, World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), focusing on local communities, tries to foster environmentally friendly practices in its global activities with little regard for the particular institutions of individual states. As a result, the autonomous rule-making authority of states is eroded to some extent.

The second strand of neoliberalism is interdependence liberalism. This strand states that the higher level of transnational relations between countries means the higher level of interdependence (Robert & Georg, 2007). According to David Mitrany, the greater interdependence in form of transnational tie between countries could lead to peace since the complex interdependence brings more friendly, reciprocal, and cooperative relationship between state governments (Robert & Georg, 2007). As clearly seen in Asia Pacific today, the economic interdependence among states (except North Korea) in this region is almost unprecedented after the Second World War and particularly the demise of the Soviet Union along with the increase in regional transnationalism and the advancement of economic liberalism and globalization. As the degree of economic interdependence is significantly high, this region remains quite peaceful despite some marginal disputes. Therefore, based on the reality, the high level of economic interdependence among states in Asia Pacific leads to the higher level of peace maintenance in this region. For concrete example, after the China’s economic reform in 1978 toward the world market economy with private sectors, the economic relations between China and Japan today have become more economically independent despite only some marginal/small tension on the issue of territorial claim between them. Japan needs China’s big market potentials and conducts business in China on a larger scale. Plus, Japan sees that the growing surplus of cheap capital, in combination with a policy that explicitly encouraged foreign FDIs, particularly in the four newly created Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian provinces and in the coastal cities (Claes, Patrik, & Naoyuki, 2009). In return, China also benefits from more Japanese FDIs and foreign trade potentials. The figure of the bilateral trade and mutual investment based on Sino-Japanese economic interdependence reached from $1 billion to $266.79 billion in 2008 (Jifeng, 2010) and is estimated that there will be more positive outcomes after the global financial crisis in 2009. Consequently, as the strong economic interdependence rises, peace between Japan and China remains more optimistic since there has been no any large-scale devastating wars between these countries so far.

Besides, the third strand of neoliberalism, institutional liberalism, is an important theory to best explain today’s international events. According to institutional liberalism, international organizations or institutions help cooperate among states such as UN, EU, ASEAN, WTO, WB, IMF, and the like and also make a set of rules, norms as well as international treaties like today Kyoto Protocol, TAC, TRIPS of WTO, UN and ASEAN Charter, and many more binding international conventions/treaties for the sake of mutual advantages and durable peace (Robert & Georg, 2007). Sure enough, after the failure of the League of Nations, the emergence of today’s UN since 1945 is an international intergovernmental organization under UN Charter to help promote development and maintain international peace and security through its peacekeeping operations, specialized agencies and development programs, and sanctions, particular the economic sanctions as penalty on the belligerent states. For instance, the test of nuclear weapons by North Korea in 2006 and again in 2009, the sinking of South Korean Cheonan ship by North Korean torpedo, and currently the launch of North Korean artillery shells on South Korean islands that would threaten the world peace and security are strongly criticized by UN as well as other countries. In response, UN and those states, especially U.S., have imposed the heavy economic sanctions on North Korea in order to pressure North Korea to turn back to peaceful negotiations and to prevent more aggressive future actions. Without UN, it is more likely that North Korea would be more and more aggressive in violation of international norms and the world peace and security. Another good example is ASEAN. Under umbrella of ASEAN Charter along with the existing international treaties and declarations, ASEAN member states cooperatively build and foster mutual understanding, provide mutual reciprocal assistances, and build durable peace, stability, as well as prosperity. Consequently, there is no any noticeable large-scale devastating war or conflict among members in this Southeast Asian region.

Moreover, the last major strand of neoliberalism, republican liberalism, can best interpret today’s events. This theory claims that the liberal democracies are more peaceful and law-abiding than the other political systems (Robert & Georg, 2007; WP, n.d.). Simply put, the argument is that democratic states do not fight with each other. In his essay “Perpetual Peace” written in 1795, Immanuel Kant agreed with the above argument and validated that the constitutional republics was only one of several necessary conditions for a perpetual peace because the majority of people in the republican or democratic political system would never vote to go to wars unless in self-defense (WP, n.d.; Ludwing, 2002; Robert & Georg, 2007) and will not advocate and support wars between other democracies. To support the argument, Melvin Small and J. David Singer responded in 1976 that they found an absence of wars between democratic states and only the marginal/small disputes that would be possible to occur. For example, regarding to the Khmer-Thai border dispute, the possibility of large-scale wars between both democratic countries, Cambodia and Thailand, is so small since the majority of people of these two countries do not want to have wars with one another, and state governments themselves are also not willingly to wage any large-scale wars that would harm the nature of democracy and their national interests. Moreover, at regional level, according to the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, the potential member countries of EU must be democracies (Andrew & Joshua, 2007) because it is generally believed that democracies rarely go to war with one another and that human rights, market-oriented policies, and rules of law are strictly respected. For sure, currently so far we have not seen any huge devastating armed conflicts or wars among those 27 democratic EU countries. Additionally, according to Immanuel Kant, it is possible to encourage what he called “spirit of commerce” for mutual and reciprocal economic gain between democracies in economic cooperation and exchange, and the republican liberalism also argues that peace in democracies is strengthened through economic cooperation and interdependence (Robert & Georg, 2007). Surely, in the same EU case, based on the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, all EU members have to eliminate their tariff and non-tariff barriers in order to make the trade flow smoothly in a single EU market (Andrew & Joshua, 2007) for the mutual economic reciprocity leading to peace. Strongly note that the recent EU financial crisis teaches EU a great lesson to reformulate or modify its fundamental economic policies among its democratic member states toward more effective and more productive EU economies through cooperation in democratic nature which results in durable peace in the EU region.

Moreover, Immanuel Kant agree that democracies hold the common moral values which lead to the formation of “peaceful union” in which there is the promotion of the mutual understanding and peaceful ways of resolving conflicts are seen morally superior to violent behaviors in democracies (Robert & Georg, 2007). Supportively, according to Michael Doyle, the republican or democratic countries have democratic political cultures in nature based on peaceful conflict resolutions (Robert & Georg, 2007). To apply this theory in today’s event, we should take a study case of Korean peninsula crisis. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, there has been no any peace agreement reached by two Koreas. Noticeably, the tensions have been waged since North Korea under the authoritarian/dictatorial regime has developed its nuclear program and tested its nuclear weapons in 2006 and again in 2009. The process of peaceful conflict resolutions have been taken by many states involved and two Koreas themselves through many negotiations and diplomatic Six-party talks in order to put an end to the North Korea’s nuclear program and reach the peace agreement between both Koreas. However, the talks and other diplomatic negotiations have so far produced no any successful result. In May 2010, North Korean torpedo attacked a South Korean Navy ship named Cheonan carrying 104 personnel of whom 46 seamen were killed. And again in November 2010, North Korea fired dozens of its artillery shells onto a South Korean island and killed two South Korean soldiers and civilians. Since the North Korea is under nondemocratic or authoritarian/dictatorial regime, there are low possibilities that peaceful conflict resolutions could be successfully reached to realize the peace agreement and normalization of diplomatic relations. On the contrary, there is the high belief that armed conflict or violence could be waged any time in the Korean peninsula as we have seen so far the tensions and armed race started first by North Korea. Again, back to the example of the current Khmer-Thai border issue, even though some marginal confrontations happened, two democratic state governments still have pursued peaceful resolutions through bilateral diplomatic negotiations. At local and national level, diplomatic relations, economic cooperation, foreign trade, tourism, socio-cultural events, and the like are normally processing. Likely, it is more optimistically believed that there could be a peaceful resolution reached quickly by these democratic countries, Cambodia and Thailand, regarding to border issue if Thailand could be more democratic in respect to international law and majority vote of its people in choosing a government.

In conclusion, in sociological liberalism, on one hand, the transnationalism or transnational relations of not only state actors but also non-state actors could pave the way for resolutions of the common issues and global challenges. States’ national sovereignty, on another hand, is being eroded since there is the high degree and the expansion of transnationalism. Moreover, in interdependence liberalism, it is strongly validated that the higher level of transnational relations means the greater level of interdependence. Consequently, this strong tie/interdependence, particularly economic interdependence, leads to peace and reciprocity among states involved. Also, the institutional liberalism claims that the international institutions could maintain national benefits and strengthen the relationship as well as peace among states through cooperation, norms, rules of law, and international treaties. Last but not least, the republican liberalism strongly believes that the high possibility of peace could be reached and maintained mostly in the republican or democratic countries. Clearly seen, the neoliberalism consisting of four main theoretical strands mentioned above is the fundamental theory to best explain today’s events ranging from national individuals, groups, and organizations to international state and non-state actors and from local issues to global challenges in the current complex, diverse international relations.

References：

Andrew, B., & Joshua, C. (2007). An atlas of world affairs. USA and Canada: Routledge.

Claes, G. A., Patrik, S., & Naoyuki, Y. (2009). On the economic interdependence between China and Japan: Challenges and possibilities. Retrieved November 27, 2010 from http://onlinelibr ary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8373.2009.01393.x/full

Englehart, N. A. (2004). Must states be sovereign?: Globalization and state power. Retrieved November 16, 2010 from http://www.cchs.ccsd.k12.co.us/academics/class_projects /AP CompGov/engle hart%20paper.pdf

Jifeng, Z. (2010). Sino-Japan trade boost bilateral tie. Retrieved November 27, 2010 from http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-08/28/content_11218743.htm

ILO. (2010, September 30). Labour relations, collective agreements, clothing and textile industries, trade union rights. Retrieved November 29, 2010 from http://www.ilo.org/ asia/info/ public/pr/lang--en/WCMS_145232/index.htm

Ludwing, V. M. (2002) Liberalism in the classical tradition (3rd ed. p.24). The United Stated of America: Cobden Press & The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc.

Margaret, B. (n.d.). Non-state actors and their significance. Retrieved November 28, 2010 from http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.3/features/maggie_buse_nsa/maggie_buse.htm

Robert, J., & Georg, S. (2007). Introduction to international relations: Theories and approaches (3rd ed. p.101). The United States of America: Oxford University Press Inc.

WP. (n.d.) The democratic peace theory. Retrieved November 26, 2010 from http://www. random-world.net/world2.html